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PRIVATIZING EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS
Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown*
Among the many struggles and victories of the movement for LGBT
equality in the United States, securing employment protections at the federal level
has proven to be a persistent challenge. The "Employment Non-Discrimination
Act" (ENDA), would prohibit disparate treatment in employment on the basis of
sexual orientation. This bill has been proposed several times in Congress but has
never been enacted, despite public opinion that appears to overwhelmingly support
employment protections for gay and lesbian workers.2
This Essay argues that while gay-rights advocates and supportive law
makers continue to work for statutory protections, private commitments cannot
only fill the gap, they can also hasten our progress toward full statutory
protections. To be most effective, however, those private commitments should, to
the extent possible, mirror our best predictions about the requirements and
procedures that will obtain when statutes are eventually enacted. Such private
imitation of potential public protection not only enhances the remedial benefits
afforded by the private commitments in the short term, it also allows the private
efforts to demonstrate what might happen in the longer term, when public
protections are enacted.
This Essay focuses on a little-known piece of intellectual property, the
certification mark, which provides a viable mechanism for employers to commit to
* Ian Ayres is the William K. Townsend Professor of Law at Yale Law School
and also a Professor at Yale's School of Management. Jennifer Gerarda Brown is a
Professor of Law at Quinnipiac University School of Law. This Article appears in Volume
49 Number 3 of the Arizona Law Review, which collects papers originally presented at the
AALS Section on Contracts, New Frontiers in Private Ordering, January 5, 2007.
1. H.R. 3285, 108th Congo (2003). Just a few months before this Article went to
press, Congressional sponsors introduced a new version of ENDA, one that would include
gender identity as well as sexual orientation in the scope of protection. H.R. 2015, I 10th
Congo (2007); see also Bob Roehr, ENDA Reintroduced in Congress, WINDY CITY TIMES,
May 2, 2007, available at http://www.windycitymediagroup.com/gay/lesbianlnews/
ARTICLE.php?AID=14763 (last visited May 3, 2007). This development necessitates
revisions to the licensing agreement. See infra pp. 596-597 (explaining wording and
rationale for inclusion of gender identity in the revised Fair Employment Mark licensing
agreement).
2. The Gallup Poll, Homosexual Relations, http://www.galluppoll.com/
content/?ci=165l (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
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the exact substantive duties of ENDA. In earlier work, we introduced our
certification mark, the "Fair Employment Mark"] along with its licensing
agreement, which gives a licensee's employees and applicants contract rights of
action as third-party beneficiaries if the licensee discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation.4 By signing a licensing agreement, an employer gains the right
(but not the obligation) to display the mark and in return promises to abide by the
word-for-word strictures of ENDA. Other certification marks (such as the Good
Housekeeping Seal, the UL (Underwriters Laboratory), and the Orthodox Union
(Kosher)) require the owner of the mark to police licensees,5 but our proposed Fair
Employment Mark allows employees and applicants to enforce the ENDA duties
directly as express third-party beneficiaries of the license. The Fair Employment
Mark thus replicates the core enforcement mechanism of ENDA by creating
private causes of action for the same class of individuals who would benefit from
the bill's passage.
In this Essay, we will take up some issues we have heretofore addressed
only in passing. First, we will discuss in greater detail the public good that might
be produced by private contracting such as the Fair Employment Mark licensing
agreement. Second, we will explain why, in addition to these public benefits, self-
interest might drive employers to adopt the Fair Employment Mark as a means of
litigation risk management. Third, we will consider the balance of public and
private good when the fair employment license agreement-and most importantly,
the associated rights of action in third-party beneficiaries of the agreement-
become subject to arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Finally, we will
discuss a few potential revisions to the licensing agreement.
I. PUBLIC GOOD CREATED BY FAIR EMPLOYMENT LICENSING
AGREEMENT: PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF A PROPOSED STATUTE
In addition to the private benefits afforded employees who would gain
protections they now lack, the Fair Employment Mark offers a surprising public
benefit: it provides a mechanism for producing precedent about a statute even
before the statute is enacted. The inevitable litigation that would arise under the
mark would provide legislators with information about how courts might interpret
ENDA if it were enacted, as well as a lower bound on the litigation rates it might
engender.
3. ® See generally Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Fair Employment
Mark, http://www.fairemploymentmark.org (last visited June 16, 2007) (information about
the mark and certification process).
4. See generally Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing
Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1639
(2006).
5. Underwriters Laboratories, http://www.ul.com (last visited May 3, 2007)
(providing extensive information about UL safety standards and how products can be tested
to earn the UL seal); Good Housekeeping Seal Directory,
http://www.goodhousekeepingseal.com (last visited May 3, 2007) (information about Good
Housekeeping seal); OU Kosher.org, http://www.oukosher.org (last visited May 3, 2007)
(information regarding the "OU" kosher certification mark).
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It is reasonable for readers to object at this point, "impossible-statutes
must be enacted before they can be interpreted." But the key to this puzzle lies in
the fact that the licensing agreement explicitly adopts the words of a proposed
statute in order to put its provisions into effect. The licensing agreement states its
goal: "WHEREAS Licensee desires to privately commit to non-discrimination as
defined in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) as proposed in
S. 1705, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003)." This version of the ENDA bill is attached
to the license; the substantive "Standards of Fair Employment" included in the
license are taken word-for-word from the bill. Thus, when a court is asked to
interpret the meaning of the words in the license, it will be interpreting the same
words that appear in the proposed bill. Even though the court will be interpreting a
contractual promise, the foregoing "whereas" clause will lead the court to ask
whether the employer's conduct would have run afoul of ENDA had the bill been
enacted.
Infonnation about how courts will interpret ENDA can address legislative
concerns about supporting the bill. In particular, it will address the concern that
"activist judges" will extend the statute beyond its borders. Resolving these
possible ambiguities can ease the bill's passage, in part because the legislators can
expressly approve or disapprove of the precedent that develops under the licensing
agreement. Just as Congress expressly disapproved of some Supreme Court
precedent and expressly approved of other precedent when it passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,6 so too Congress would have the option of explicitly
embracing or rejecting particular court interpretations of the Fair Employment
Mark licensing agreement when considering whether to pass ENDA. The
substantive language of the nondiscrimination requirement in a future proposal of
ENDA might even change in response to this precedent.
Of course, pre-passage license precedent and post-passage ENDA
precedent would be distinct in important ways. As a fonnal matter, an
interpretation of contractual language would not be binding on a court interpreting
statutory language in a post-passage case. This is particularly true when different
courts are involved. With the exception of a few federal cases brought under
diversity jurisdiction, the bulk of the license precedent would come from state
courts, while post-passage ENDA interpretations would be rendered by federal
courts. Federal courts might be reluctant to defer to state court interpretations of
federal statutory language---especially when those interpretations had occurred
before the federal statute had been passed. Then again, if legislators affinnatively
refer to these state court decisions in the congressional record when debating and
enacting the eventual ENDA statute, the precedential value of the state court
decisions would increase.
The flip side is that congressional action could also render this pre-
passage precedent irrelevant. The language of many bills is significantly amended
before passage, and the language of proposed legislation often changes from year
to year as revised bills are introduced in successive legislative sessions. Our
licensing agreement takes account of this possibility by allowing us to update the
licensing language on an ongoing basis. We can thus attempt to keep pace with the
6. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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legislative state of play, but changes may occur at such a fast pace or so much at
the eleventh hour that, by the time the statute is actually enacted, it could be quite
different from the version incorporated into our licensing agreement.
Still, the mark represents a new form of federalism. We traditionally think
of federalism as competition among jurisdictions, with individual states acting as
the laboratories for legal experimentation. Instead of jurisdictional federalism, the
mark facilitates corporate federalism, whereby individual corporations experiment
with taking on the duties of a proposed bill. The Fair Employment Mark is an
example of "corporate federalism," in which individual business organizations are
allowed to experiment with different regulatory structures. Of course, any regime
with freedom of contract allows corporate experimentation. But the Fair
Employment Mark allows a type of structured experimentation. It is thus akin to
corporate statutes that give individual businesses discrete choices, e.g., opting into
particular "control transaction" protections or opting out ofcertain duties of care.7
This potential for corporate federalism suggests a broader social benefit
that the mark might offer. A different theory is needed to explain why individual
companies would benefit from the mark-and it is to this question that we now
tum.
II. LITIGATION RISK MANAGEMENT: EMPLOYER INCENTIVES TO
ADOPT THE MARK
8
In the approximately two years that have passed since we first proposed
the Fair Employment Mark,9 the most frequent-and spirited-push back we face
is skepticism that employers would have any incentive to sign the licensing
agreement. "Why on earth," the question goes, "would any employer in its right
mind sign on for increased potential liability?"
There are many reasons employers might adopt the mark-and the
reasons vary according to the business environments in which the employers
operate. Employers might sign the license (and thereby take on the risk of
discrimination liability) to: I) attract more customers,1O including state and local
EEO officers who are charged to contract only with non-discriminating
employers;" 2) recruit employees, including gay and gay-friendly applicants;'2
7. Ayres & Brown, supra note 4, at 1647 & n.23.
8. This section of our Essay borrows heavily from Richard F. Ober Jr. & Ian
Ayres, The Hollow Promise: Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination Policies, ACC DOCKET,
Oct. 2006, at 48 (arguing that, by rewriting their companies' nondiscrimination policies or,
better yet, adopting the Fair Employment Mark, counsel can enhance their companies'
images and even limit liability in the process).
9. Ayres & Brown, supra note 4, at 1641.
10. ld. at 1681-82.
II. For example, in 1997 San Francisco enacted the Equal Benefits Ordinance
which requires city contractors to provide the same benefits to employees who have
domestic partners and those that are married. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oakland, San Mateo,
Seattle, Minneapolis, Broward County, Florida, and Portland, Maine have all enacted
similar statutes. See CYNTHIA G. GOLDSTEIN, SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
FNE YEAR REpORT ON THE SAN FRANCISCO EQUAL BENEFITS ORDINANCE (2002), available
at http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights-page.asp?id=6295 (last visited July 7, 2007).
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and 3) appease input suppliers, including accreditation organizations and unions
that already press for non-binding nondiscrimination provisions. 13
Some employers might sign the license because their employees already
have private rights of action under state law or local ordinance. 14 The litigation
cost to such employers in states that have prohibited sexual orientation
discrimination has been quite modest. 15
Still others may sign simply because it is the right thing to do. Many,
many employers have already included sexual orientation in their non-binding
nondiscrimination policies. For such employers, signing the license may mean
only that the employer will never defend a claim by denying that it promised not to
discriminate.
Importantly (and at first blush somewhat paradoxically), some employers
might sign to define and thus contain their potential discrimination liability, since
the licensing agreement mirrors ENDA's limitations on certain aspects of liability
(e.g., 180-day filing requirement, no disparate impact). Currently, in many
jurisdictions employers have adopted nondiscrimination policies that expose
See generally WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY: A REVIEW OF LAWS
AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2000), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/
1999LegislatingEquality.pdf(last visited July 3, 2007).
12. For example, "IBM ... has a GLBT-employee network with 1,200 active
members worldwide and uses these recruiting tactics to show MBAs that the company is a
safe environment." Suzanne Robitaille, B-Schools Gain a Lavender Tinge, BusINESS WEEK,
August 5, 2004, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/aug2004/
bs2004085_7225_bsOO1.htrn (last visited July 6, 2007). Moreover, in April 2004, big name
companies, such as Ford Motor Co., Sun Microsystems, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley,
participated in a GLBT recruiting and networking conference known as "Reaching Out
MBA." Patrick J. Kiger, Diversity Aside, Does it Pay to Look For Gays?, WORKFORCE
MANAGEMENT ONLINE, March 2004, http://www.workforce.com/archive/feature/
23/65/32/index.php.
13. The Association of American Law Schools requires member schools to
include sexual orientation in their nondiscrimination policies as well as to stop
discrimination by employers using the school's career facilities. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS, 2005 HANDBOOK bylaws 6-3(b), 6-3.2 (2005) In addition, an AFL-CIO
affiliate, Pride at Work, has been successful with union negotiation. Ayres & Brown, supra
note 4, at 1677.
14. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-81c (West 2004); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2 (2004); 775 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/1-102
(2006); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2005); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (2005);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2005); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (West
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7 (2005);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2005); OR. REv. STAT. § 659A.030 (2003), amended by
2007 Or. Laws ch. 100; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495
(2005). As of 2002, 119 cities and 23 counties prohibited employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation. Darren McKewen, Will HR Executives Earn 'C-Level' Posts?,
CAREERJOURNAL.COM, http://www.careetjournal.com/hrcenter/briefs/20030609-bna.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
15. See Ayres & Brown, supra note 4, at 1669-71.
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employers to the possibility of open-ended substantive and procedural liability,
including, for example, liability based upon the disparate impact of a policy or
practice. 16 By adopting the mark, employers can actually restrict, better quantify,
and better control their litigation risk.
For example, a policy that prohibits "discrimination" might be interpreted
to give employees both "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" causes of
action. In such a state, a company might have to defend disparate impact suits
challenging any policy (such as one refusing to provide medical benefits for HIV)
that disproportionately disadvantages gay employees. In contrast, a move from
unenforceable "policies" to explicit, enforceable "promises" can give employers
more control over their potential exposure. Because ENDA would outlaw only
disparate treatment, the licensing agreement expressly excludes disparate impact
claims and affirmative action from its reach. 17 Thus, unlike a court's interpretation
of a general nondiscrimination policy, express promises (like those contained in
the Fair Employment Mark licensing agreement) can be limited to disparate
treatment.
Compared to a general nondiscrimination policy, express promises can
also limit potential remedies. A licensing agreement can disclaim, for example,
punitive damages, damages for emotional distress, or injunctive relief. A licensing
agreement could cap compensatory damages or limit remedies to back wages.
A licensing agreement can be more effective than a general
nondiscrimination policy in providing employers with procedural safeguards. The
Fair Employment Mark agreement, for example, requires employees to give notice
of claims within a certain period, consistent with the requirements of ENDA as
most recently proposed. 18 Perhaps the most important procedural constraint desired
by many employers faced with potential liability for discrimination is one that
permits them to avoid courts entirely; these employers can opt instead to resolve
employment disputes in arbitration. The next Section will consider the
implications of this procedural "safeguard" in greater detail.
III. ARBITRATING CLAIMS UNDER THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT MARK
Under ENDA, as is true under Title VII, discrimination disputes would be
arbitrable so long as the arbitration agreement was conscionable. 19 Explicit
16. Such a situation may occur where a policy that denies benefits to unmarried
domestic partners could be said to have a disparate impact on LGBT employees, since these
employees may not have the option of getting married and receiving benefits the way
employees and their different-sexed partners can do. See, e.g., Levin v. Yeshiva, 754 N.E.2d
1099 (N.Y. 2001) (holding students' complaint sufficient to allege a disparate impact on
basis of sexual orientation, in violation of New York City Civil Rights Law, where lesbian
students in committed, long-term relationships were denied university housing as a result of
their failure to provide proof of marriage).
17. Ayres & Brown, supra note 4, at 1696.
18. /d. at 1676, 1698.
19. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that a
contract requiring arbitration of all employment disputes is enforceable under federal law),
remanded to 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ordinary principles of state contract
law determine validity of agreement to arbitrate and, because arbitration agreement was
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nondiscrimination promises could require that all discrimination claims be
submitted to arbitration (or some other dispute resolution mechanism).
Indeed, arbitration clauses in employment contracts have been gaining in
popularity, at least among employers.2o Many enforceable arbitration agreements
between employers and employees will be broadly worded to include "[a]ny
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [employment contract].,,21
The agreement could encompass even distinct rights of action arising outside of,
but related to, the employment contract, such as the employee's claim as a third-
party beneficiary of the Fair Employment Mark licensing agreement.22 Broad
arbitration clauses have the potential to remove many claims under the mark from
the public fora of state courts to the privacy of arbitration tribunals. These tribunals
may not produce a written opinion or, if an opinion is produced, the opinion may
remain private. Arbitration thus has the potential to undermine the
predictive/precedent-creating aspect of the Fair Employment Mark.23
To remedy this effect, the Fair Employment Mark licensing agreement
could expressly exempt claims under the Fair Employment Mark from any
otherwise applicable arbitration clause (effecting a limited, preemptive waiver of
the arbitration clause by the employer). Such a waiver would preserve the ability
of courts to create precedent interpreting substantive ENDA-like language but at
the expense of procedural verisimilitude. If ENDA, once enacted, would create
rights of action that would be covered by arbitration clauses, the experimental
period of enforcing ENDA through the Fair Employment Mark should also
incorporate arbitration. Artificially disabling arbitration agreements that would
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable under California law, it was
unenforceable), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002). We believe the same standards should
generally apply to the licensing agreement, ENDA, and Title VII.
20. From 1998 until 2003, the number of employees required to arbitrate by
AAA clauses increased from three to seven million. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1640 n.43 (2005).
21. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
CLAUSES-A PRACTICAL GUIDE 19 (2004), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4125.
22. Arguably, since the licensing agreement does not include an arbitration
clause, job applicants would be free to litigate claims arising from it. Even employees who
signed employment contracts containing arbitration clauses might be able to litigate
violations of the employment mark, qua third-party beneficiaries of the licensing agreement.
The scope of the arbitration clause within the employment contract could be broad enough,
however, to include the licensing agreement, since a violation of the licensing agreement
would certainly "arise out of or relate to" the contract of employment.
23. In this respect, the Fair Employment Mark litigation could suffer the same
fate as other attempts to develop the law when arbitration clauses potentially draw cases out
of courts where precedent can be created. See Sternlight, supra note 20, at 1661-65 (arguing
mandatory arbitration impedes the creation of public precedent). This concern may be
overstated. Because fewer than five percent of civil cases are tried on the merits in federal
courts, the absence of arbitration is no guarantee that cases will contribute to the creation of
precedent. We should recognize, however, that cases need not be tried to create precedent.
Rulings on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment often include important
conclusions of law that contribute greatly to subsequent parties' negotiations and other
dealings.
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otherwise be in force reduces the predictive value of litigation under the Fair
Employment Mark.
The better solution would be to require that any arbitration of Fair
Employment Mark claims must result in a written opinion that will be made
publicly available. Such a provision strikes a balance between the two phenomena
the mark seeks to demonstrate: the way decision makers will interpret ENDA's
proposed employment protections and the reality that those decision makers will
likely be private arbitrators as well as judges.
Still, a provision requiring written results will likely depart from
conditions that would adhere once ENDA passed, since many employers would
include in their employment contracts provisions requiring confidentiality and no
written arbitration opinion.24 It might be that Fair Employment Mark arbitrations
with written opinions would render larger awards for employees than would
emerge from confidential arbitrations after ENDA is enacted; arbitrators who go
on record in a written opinion might be anxious not to appear to favor the
employer, a repeat player.25 But if a writing requirement for Fair Employment
Mark arbitrations produces this sort of inaccuracy, we might consider the
inaccuracy an advantage because it will show employers, courts, and legislators an
outer bound on employer liability. If the Fair Employment Mark does not produce
a flood of litigation or a string of runaway awards for employees, it is highly
unlikely that ENDA will do so, since we are designing the procedure for mark-
related litigation to be slightly more favorable for employees than ENDA litigation
would be. Indeed, if the writing requirement in the licensing agreement does not
produce dire consequences, this might suggest a legislative compromise to deal
with the current controversy over mandatory arbitration of employment
discrimination clauses. Perhaps Congress could amend Title VII to make clear that
any arbitration of claims arising under Title VII must result in a written award
available to the public.26
24. But see Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (using five factors, including a written opinion, to evaluate an arbitration agreement).
25. The ability to channel employment disputes into arbitration has been
important to many employers. Arbitration can also be a valuable way to manage risk and
curtail potential liability, particularly for employers that are repeat players. Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J.
189,209 (1997) (arguing that employees lose more often, and arbitrators award damages to
employees less frequently and in lower amounts, when the employer is a repeat player);
Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review ofEmployment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 223, 234 (1998)
(noting that, on average, in repeat player cases employees recover only eleven percent of
what they demand, but in cases against employers that are not repeat players they recover
forty-eight percent of what they demand).
26. See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C.
L. REv. 927, 971 (2006) (suggesting judicial approval of settlement agreements which
would then become part of the public record); JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 3 (2005),
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDFlEmployment_Arbitration_Min_Std.pdf (The policy
requires an arbitration award to "consist of a written statement signed by the Arbitrator
regarding the disposition of each claim and the relief, if any, awarded as to each claim. The
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The central tension in this discussion is between the mark's power to
ameliorate the discrimination suffered by gay and lesbian workers and the mark's
power to predict what might happen if Congress were to pass ENDA. We have
chosen to cOilstrain the remedial aspects of the mark in order to preserve some
predictive power. In the next Section, we discuss revisions to our existing licensing
agreement that might be necessary or advisable moving forward.
IV. REVISIONS TO THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT MARK LICENSING
AGREEMENT
Given the balancing considerations discussed above, we are led to the
first of our revisions to the current Fair Employment Mark licensing agreement.
Henceforth, licensees will agree that if a claim under the mark is subject to
arbitration, the arbitrator will produce a written opinion that will be available to the
public. This provision will suspend otherwise enforceable confidentiality
agreements in arbitration clauses with respect to claims under the mark.
Arbitration is not the only consideration of risk management that leads us
to revise the Fair Employment Mark licensing agreement. To placate potential
licensees further, we plan two additional revisions to the agreement. The first
revision defines more explicitly the class of third-party beneficiaries entitled to sue
under the mark. The second, in standard contractual form, uses a merger clause to
reassure licensees that they will not inadvertently take on more litigation risk than
necessary.
Nondiscrimination policies in force at many places of employment may
fail to cover discrimination against rejected applicants; since the rejected applicant
is not hired, courts find no enforceable promise between the applicant and the
employer.27 Applicants thus lose the chance to sue under the employer's
nondiscrimination policy. The fair employment licensing agreement does include
such people as third-party beneficiaries: it expressly grants rejected applicants
rights to sue for discrimination. But what about people who fail even to apply for a
job because an employer has expressed a discriminatory policy? This class of
potential litigants cannot sue under the mark. They are not express third-party
Arbitrator will also provide a concise written statement of the reasons for the Award, stating
the essential fmdings and conclusions on which the award is based."). But see Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, Mediation & Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the
Employment Relationship, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535 (1995) (not requiring a
written award as part of its Due Process Protocols). Furthermore, Rule 26(a) of JAMS
Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures requires that "JAMS and the Arbitrator shall
maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including the
Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a judicial challenge to or enforcement of an
Award, or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision." JAMS, JAMS
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES (2007), http://www.jamsadr.com/
rules/employment_arbitration_Rules.asp#twenty-six.
27. The applicant might argue that even if there is not an employment contract,
there was an independent application contract whereby the applicant agreed to apply in
return for the employer's promise to consider the application on a non-discriminatory basis.
But courts might resurrect the requirement that the applicant knew and actually relied on the
employer policy.
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beneficiaries. We plan revisions in the licensing agreement to make this clearer:
"there are no other intended third-party beneficiaries" including customers,
nonapplicants, or others. This language parallels Title VII and ENDA.
We also propose a somewhat self-protective revision for the licensing
agreement: an integration clause. The language we propose is as follows:
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. This Agreement evidences the complete understanding
and agreement of the Parties with respect to the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement and supersedes and merges all
previous understandings and agreements, whether oral or written,
between the Parties relating to these transactions.
Each Party acknowledges that, in agreeing to enter into this
Agreement, it has not relied on any representation, warranty,
collateral contract or other assurance (except those set out in this
Agreement and any documents referred to in it) made by or on
behalf of any other Party or any other person whatsoever before the
execution of this Agreement. This Agreement may not be modified
except by a writing subscribed to by authorized representatives of
both parties.
Our final, and perhaps most important, change in the licensing agreement
is one that protects employees from discrimination based upon gender identity as
well as sexual orientation. When we first proposed the Fair Employment Mark, we
acknowledged that "[it] the next version of ENDA proposed in Congress includes
gender identity, the argument for covering gender identity in the Fair Employment
Mark would strengthen. ,,28 In a subsequent and more detailed treatment of the
mark, we said that "[0]ur intention is to conform the license to the potentially
evolving language of ENDA as reflected in legislation embraced by major
congressional cosponsors.,,29 Now that gender identity has been included in the
most recent bill introduced by Barney Frank, long-time advocate for ENDA, along
with dozens of cosponsors in the House of Representatives,3° the time is right to
change the language of the licensing agreement as well.
Therefore, the licensing agreement will be revised to provide that the
licensee promises to abide by the following standards of fair employment:
STANDARDS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT. Licensee promises
not to engage in the following employment practices:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the
individual, because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual
orientation or gender identity; ENDA, H.R. 2015, llOth Congo
§ 4(a)(l) (attached hereto); or
28. IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: How TO
MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RiGHTS 84 (2005).
29. Ayres & Brown, supra note 4, at 1658.
30. H.R. 3285, 108th Congo (2003).
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(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or applicants for
employment of the employer in any way that would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise adversely
affect the status of the individual as an employee, because of such
individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
identity; ENDA, H.R. 2015, II0th Congo § 4(a)(2) (attached hereto);
or
(3) to discriminate against any individual because of the actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of the individual in
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide
apprenticeship or other training; ENDA, H.R. 2015, 110th Congo §
4(d) (attached hereto); or
(4) to discriminate against an individual because such individual
opposed any of the employment practices described in subsections
(I) through (3), or because such individual made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing concerned with this License; ENDA, H.R.
2015, I 10th Congo § 5 (attached hereto); or
The employment practices described in any of subsections (1)
through (3) shall be considered to include an action described in that
subsection, taken against an individual based on the actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity of a person with
whom the individual associates or has associated; ENDA, H.R.
2015, I 10th Congo § 4(e) (attached hereto).
These changes will bring the licensing agreement up to date with the
current state of legislative play. Although the inclusion of gender identity in the
protections of the Fair Employment Mark may discourage some employers from
adopting it, there are others who will find the new version of the mark more
consistent with their current policies and therefore more appealing. In any case, we
are persuaded that this has become the gold standard for employment
nondiscrimination. Moreover, the center of legislative gravity seems to have
shifted decisively in favor of gender identity's inclusion, so that the mark will
achieve greatest predictive power by also encompassing this characteristic in its
protection.
CONCLUSION
The Fair Employment Mark has the potential to significantly improve the
work lives of many LGBT employees, creating rights of action they now lack for
discrimination on the job. But the Fair Employment Mark is more than
ameliorative. If a sufficient number of employers adopt the mark and some number
are accused of violating it, we could create precedent about the meaning of ENDA
before ENDA is enacted. Such "law in the shadow of bargaining,,3l may grow up
31. This phrase is from Luke Nottage, Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law and
Law in the Light of Bargaining: Contract Planning and Renegotiation in the u.s., New
Zealand, and Japan, in ONATI INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, INTERACTION OF LEGAL CULTURES: PRE-PUBLICATIONS OF THE
WORKSHOP ON CHANGING LEGAL CULTURES 113 (Johannes Feest & Volkmar Gessner eds.,
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in ways that reap benefits far beyond those realized by the initial parties to the
contract.
1998). Jonathan Macey and Ben Depoorter have also used this phrase in presentations and
unpublished work; we like the phrase for the way it flips the much more common
construction, "bargaining in the shadow of the law."
